Xi is breaking succession rules. What about everyone else?

(Edited and refined by Grace Chong, with the assistance of AI translation.)

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 21st Party Congress is expected to be held next autumn. Wu Yu-shan, an academician of Academia Sinica, believes the party’s top-level personnel arrangements could follow one of three paths: the “Jiang Zemin model”, the “20th Party Congress model”, or the “Leonid Brezhnev model”. Of these, the “20th Party Congress model” — in which the top leader remains in office while other senior leaders are replaced according to customary age limits — could intensify internal political pressures, lead to more frequent purges and increase the need for a more forceful approach abroad.

Wu, an academician of Academia Sinica and distinguished research fellow at its Institute of Political Science, studies socialist states, mainland China, cross-strait relations, and politics in Russia and Eastern Europe. He is also a jointly appointed professor at National Taiwan University. On 18 September, he delivered a keynote at a National Chengchi University seminar on the evolution of the CCP’s succession system.

The old rules of succession

Wu noted that the CCP’s past conventions on personnel changes sought to balance experience and stability while preventing the leadership from becoming too old. In principle, officials had to serve as Central Committee members for at least ten years before becoming general secretary or premier, and once in office, they would normally serve two terms. Members of the Politburo Standing Committee, meanwhile, followed the “seven up, eight down” convention: those aged 67 could remain in office or be promoted, while those aged 68 were expected to retire.

Under these rules, anyone seeking to serve two terms as the top leader could not be older than 62 when taking over and had to have become a Central Committee member before the age of 52. Former CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao and current General Secretary Xi Jinping, for example, secured their positions as successors at the ages of 50 and 54 respectively.

But beginning with the 19th Party Congress, officials who met the age requirements were no longer appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee. All members of the Politburo Standing Committee formed at the 20th Party Congress were aged 60 or above, putting them outside the aforementioned age requirements for succession.

Wu therefore believes it is highly likely that the 21st Party Congress will not designate a successor and that Xi will remain in office.

Xi and the widening age gap

Wu observed that although Xi has broken the convention that the general secretary should serve only one additional term, as well as the “seven up, eight down” rule, the age limit has continued to apply to the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

At the 20th Party Congress, Xi was already an average of 4.3 years older than the other six members. If he remains in office at the 21st Party Congress while the others are replaced as usual, the age gap will widen to at least seven years.

Thus, a question at the 21st Party Congress will be whether the age limits continue to be waived only for the top leader or are relaxed for other senior leaders as well. The answer will shape the future structure of power at the top of the party.

Three possible paths

Wu said the first possibility is that Xi could follow the example of Jiang Zemin, the late leader of the third generation, by stepping down as general secretary after three terms while retaining the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission or another source of influence.

But Wu believes this model could emerge only if the situation within the party changes. With no clear successor at present, he also expects any transfer of power to be far from smooth.

A second possibility is to maintain the 20th Party Congress model: Xi remains in office while the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee remain subject to the age limit. Under this scenario, all of them except 64-year-old Ding Xuexiang would leave and be replaced by younger serving Politburo members.

If Xi has no plan to hand over power at the 22nd Party Congress, then potential successors under the age of 55 would also not be brought into the Politburo Standing Committee.

Wu described this as a situation in which “Xi is running ahead on his own, while everyone else moves up according to age”. But suppressing the succession process, with only the top leader exempt from the old rules, would instead increase political risks within the party and make personnel upheaval more frequent.

The third path is the Leonid Brezhnev model, in which Xi and several members of the Politburo Standing Committee — or even the wider Politburo — break through the age limits together.

Senior officials would support one another because they share an interest in remaining in office, producing greater stability at the top. But the resulting stagnation in personnel changes would extend downwards, while the system would become increasingly conservative and rigid.

Pressure to prove himself

Wu believes that, if the current situation continues, Xi is inclined to maintain the 20th Party Congress model. He cautioned, however, that under this arrangement the leader would face mounting challenges and continued pressure to purge the ranks.

He would therefore need to project strength abroad and “convince the people through achievements” to bolster the legitimacy of his continued rule. This could increase both the motivation and the capacity to take decisive action.

In an interview after the seminar, Wu elaborated that, in seeking to prove himself, the CCP’s top leader might be “tough towards the party, and could not possibly back down towards the US, and towards Taiwan as well … [he would need] to produce some achievements”.

Wu said, “Many people believe that the stronger Xi becomes, the greater the threat to Taiwan. I don’t see it that way.”

In his view, if Xi has firm control internally, he will have the flexibility to either exert pressure or show restraint on the Taiwan issue, allowing him to wait patiently for longer. If his power comes under challenge, however, he may instead respond more forcefully.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “台湾中研院院士：中共二十一大换届或有三种可能模式”.

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